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AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND A 
CLEAN FUEL STANDARD IN WASHINGTON STATE 
Kirsten Nelsen 
 
Abstract: Transportation fuel is the greatest contributor to greenhouse gas emissions in 
Washington State. To curb emissions, Governor Jay Inslee has charged the Washington State 
Department of Ecology with developing a Clean Fuel Standard (“CFS”) proposal, which may 
be proposed in future legislative sessions. The goal of a CFS is to reduce the overall carbon 
intensity of transportation fuel. California enacted a similar program in 2010—the low 
carbon fuel standard—which was challenged in federal court. One issue that remains open is 
whether a state low carbon fuel standard would be preempted by the federal Clean Air Act. 
This Essay considers whether the Clean Air Act would preempt a CFS in Washington. It 
concludes that a Washington CFS is unlikely to conflict with the purpose of any portion of 
the Clean Air Act and is therefore unlikely to be preempted. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The Washington State Legislature enacted a bill in 2008 that pledges 
to reduce state greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions to 1990 levels by 
2020.1 The bill requires further reductions in GHG emissions in 2035 
and 2050.2 Although it does not target specific industries, the bill will 
likely impact the transportation sector, the greatest contributor to GHG 
emissions in the state.3 For this reason, Governor Jay Inslee has 
announced that he will propose several strategies to decrease carbon 
pollution from transportation.4 One of the governor’s potential policies 
is a Clean Fuel Standard (“CFS”),5 a regulatory scheme that would 
1.  Act effective June 12, 2008, ch. 14, § 3, 2008 Wash. Sess. Laws 172 (regarding Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions) (codified at WASH. REV. CODE. § 70.235.020(1)(a)(i)) (2014). 
2.  WASH. REV. CODE § 70.235.020(1)(a)(ii)–(iii) (2014). 
3.  GAIL SANDLIN, WASHINGTON STATE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS INVENTORY 2009–2010 
7–8 (2012), available at https://fortress.wa.gov/ecy/publications/publications/1202034.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 18, 2015). 
4.  JAY INSLEE, POLICY BRIEF: WASHINGTON CARBON POLLUTION REDUCTION AND CLEAN 
ENERGY LEADERSHIP 1–2 (Dec. 14, 2014), available at 
http://www.governor.wa.gov/documents/Carbon_package_overview_2015.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 
2015). 
5.  Id. 
57 
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reduce the carbon intensity of transportation fuels.6 
Opponents to a CFS in Washington will likely challenge it on the 
basis of federal preemption under the Clean Air Act. California enacted 
a similar low carbon regulatory scheme,7 which was the topic of over 
five years of litigation challenging the authority of the state to enact the 
standard.8 In part, the plaintiffs claimed the California regulations were 
preempted by the federal Clean Air Act.9 Under the Clean Air Act, states 
cannot adopt fuel regulations that conflict with federal standards.10 
However, California is explicitly exempt from the fuel preemption 
provision of the statute.11 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
briefly considered California’s exemption from federal preemption 
under the Clean Air Act in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey,12 
but it did not analyze whether a low carbon fuel standard would have 
been preempted if enacted by a state that did not have the same 
exemption as California.13 Further, the court declined to answer whether 
the California regulations were preempted by another subsection of the 
Clean Air Act, namely Section 211(o) codifying the Energy 
Independence and Security Act (“EISA”).14 These are two issues that 
would likely affect implementation of a CFS in Washington State. 
This Essay considers whether a Washington CFS, if enacted, would 
be in danger of federal preemption under the Clean Air Act. Part I 
explains what a CFS in Washington would look like and how it 
compares to the California standard, which is likely to form the basis for 
the Washington CFS. Part II details the applicable federal preemption 
6.  JENNIFER PONT & STEFAN UNNASCH, A CLEAN FUEL STANDARD IN WASHINGTON STATE: 
REVISED ANALYSIS WITH UPDATED ASSUMPTIONS 39 (2014). 
7.  California adopted the Low Carbon Fuel Standard (“LCFS”), a set of regulations very similar 
to a CFS in Washington.  
8.  Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1107 (9th Cir. 2013); Rocky 
Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1086 (E.D. Cal. 2011); Rocky 
Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, Nos. 1:09-cv-2234-LJO-BAM, 1:10-cv-163-LJO-BAM, 
2014 WL 7004725, at *15 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2014). 
9.  Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1078. 
10.  Clean Air Act of 1970 § 211(c)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4) (2012); see also Arnold W. 
Reitze Jr., The Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives Under Section 211 of the Clean Air Act, 29 
TULSA L.J. 485, 486 (1994) (detailing the development of federal preemption of fuel regulation 
throughout the Clean Air Act amendments). 
11.  42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4)(B) (2012). 
12.  See Corey, 730 F.3d at 1106 (finding that although California is exempt from the express fuel 
preemption provision, it was not excused from compliance with the dormant commerce clause, 
which was the deciding issue in the case). 
13.  Id. 
14.  Id. 
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doctrine and the history of preemption provisions in the Clean Air Act. 
Part III discusses the litigation arising out of the California standard, 
which clarifies the challenges and potential resolutions to these 
challenges in Washington. Finally, Part IV analyzes the open federal 
preemption issues, considering likely challenges to a CFS in 
Washington. This Essay concludes that it is unlikely that a court would 
find that the federal Clean Air Act would preempt a Washington CFS 
regulatory scheme. This Essay aims to inform those in Washington, as 
well as those in other states attempting to enact similar fuel standards. 
I. A CLEAN FUEL STANDARD IN WASHINGTON 
Governor Inslee has taken steps toward proposing a CFS in 
Washington as a strategy to reduce carbon emissions. In February 2015, 
the Governor directed the Washington State Department of Ecology 
(“DOE”) to engage in public outreach and discussion surrounding the 
potential passage of a CFS.15 He did this before official legislation was 
proposed and prior to any rulemaking by DOE.16 Governor Inslee also 
commissioned an updated report analyzing the impacts of a CFS in 
Washington17 and listed it as a potential proposal to decrease carbon 
emissions in the state.18 These actions indicate that the Governor is 
seriously considering a CFS in Washington. Although there has been no 
official proposal for a CFS in Washington, this section will briefly 
outline the potential policy based on reports commissioned by the 
Governor and information released by the DOE, which suggest the 
standard will be similar to the low carbon fuel standard in California. 
California is the only state that has adopted a regulatory scheme that 
is substantially similar to one that may be proposed in Washington.19 
15.  News Release, Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, Washingtonians Can Join Discussion on Clean Fuel 
Standard (Feb. 4, 2015), available at http://www.ecy.wa.gov/news/2015/013.html. 
16.  Id.  
17.  PONT & UNNASCH, supra note 6, at 1. 
18.  JAY INSLEE, POLICY BRIEF: WASHINGTON CARBON POLLUTION REDUCTION AND CLEAN 
ENERGY LEADERSHIP 1–2 (Dec. 14, 2014) available at 
http://www.governor.wa.gov/documents/Carbon_package_overview_2015.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 
2015). 
19.  See JENNIFER PONT & JEFF ROSENFELD, A LOW CARBON FUEL STANDARD IN WASHINGTON: 
INFORMING THE DECISION 9, 48 (Feb. 18, 2011); see also PONT & UNNASCH, supra note 6, at 9 
(drawing on the experience of California’s CFS—also known as California’s low carbon fuel 
standard—to analyze market impacts of a CFS in Washington); James M. Van Nostrand & Anne 
Marie Hirschberger, Biofuels, in THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY: EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLES 445, 
447 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2011); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 §§ 95480–95490 (2015) (California’s 
Low Carbon Fuel Standard). 
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California’s standard aims to reduce GHG emissions by lowering the 
carbon intensity of transportation fuels.20 The “carbon intensity” of a 
transportation fuel is “the amount of lifecycle [GHG] emissions per unit 
of energy of fuel.”21 The lifecycle GHG emissions analysis takes into 
account the direct emissions—emissions from producing and burning the 
fuel—as well as any indirect emissions, which include land use 
changes.22 Emissions related to the full fuel lifecycle are part of the 
calculation, including “all stages of fuel and feedstock production and 
distribution, from feedstock generation or extraction through the 
distribution and delivery and ultimate consumer, where the mass values 
for all greenhouse gases are adjusted to account for their relative global 
warming potential.”23 By employing a lifecycle analysis, the California 
standard attempts to consider all carbon emissions that are released from 
the production and use of transportation fuels. 
It is likely that Washington’s CFS would mimic many of the features 
of California’s standard because two reports commissioned by the 
Washington State Department of Ecology to analyze the impacts of a 
CFS draw on California’s low carbon fuel standard for several 
assumptions.24 Like California’s standard, the CFS would require 
regulated fuel providers to reduce the average carbon intensity of fuels 
by a certain amount over a given period of time.25 A regulated fuel 
provider will receive credits for fuel sold with a carbon intensity 
measurement below the standard, and debits for fuel with a carbon 
intensity value above the standard.26 Surplus credits may be sold or 
traded to other regulated parties for use in compliance.27 
A calculation of the carbon intensity of each type of fuel requires an 
analysis of direct and indirect emissions from the entire lifecycle of the 
fuel, not just vehicle emissions.28 As an illustration, direct emissions can 
be broken into two parts: “well-to-tank” and “tank-to-wheel” 
emissions.29 “Well-to-tank” emissions are produced during fuel 
20.  CAL CODE REGS. tit. 7 § 95480 (2015). 
21.  Id. § 95481(16). 
22.  See id. § 95481(a)(28) (defining of “lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions”). 
23.  Id. 
24.  PONT & UNNASCH, supra note 6, at 9; PONT & ROSENFELD, supra note 19, at 48. 
25.  PONT & UNNASCH, supra note 6, at 39. 
26.  Id. 
27.  Id. 
28.  Id. at 20. 
29.  Id. 
 
                                                     
Nelsen-Federal Preemption and a Clean Fuel Standard-PostDTP.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/20/2015  1:19 PM 
2015] FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND A CLEAN FUEL STANDARD 61 
production and transportation.30 For example, corn ethanol production 
requires tractor fuel, fertilizer production, transport to the ethanol plant, 
fuel production emissions, and transport to refueling stations.31 “Tank to 
wheel” emissions, on the other hand, are simply vehicle tailpipe 
emissions from individual vehicles.32 
II. THE FEDERAL CLEAN AIR ACT AND PREEMPTION 
A CFS in Washington will likely be challenged under two preemption 
doctrines: express and implied preemption.33 First, opponents would 
likely argue that the Clean Air Act express fuel preemption provision, 
codified at Section 211(c)(4), expressly preempts the ability of 
Washington State to enact a CFS. Further, a CFS would likely be 
challenged under implied preemption using the federal renewable fuel 
standard, codified at Section 211(o) of the Clean Air Act. This section 
provides necessary background information regarding: (a) federal 
preemption doctrine, and (b) the two provisions in the Clean Air Act that 
could trigger federal preemption. 
A. Federal Preemption Doctrine 
Federal preemption is based on the Supremacy Clause in Article IV of 
the United States Constitution.34 Federal law may preempt state and 
local law either by express terms in statutory language, or by implication 
based on a statute’s purpose and structure.35 State law may be preempted 
by explicit language in a statute that makes it clear that Congress 
intended federal law to foreclose state action.36 “Express” preemption 
language often requires additional analysis of Congress’ intent.37 
30.  Id. 
31.  Id. 
32.  Id. 
33.  Opponents to California’s low carbon fuel standard challenged it on implied preemption, but 
the issue remains open. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 
1048–49 (E.D. Cal. 2011). Opponents to a CFS in Washington are likely to also argue express 
preemption, however, because unlike California, Washington does not have a waiver from the 
express fuel preemption provision in the Clean Air Act. See Clean Air Act of 1970 § 211(c)(B), 42 
U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4)(B) (2012). 
34.  U.S. CONST. art. VI (“This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made under the Authority of the 
United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land. . . .”). 
35.  See Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992). 
36.  Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992). 
37.  See id. at 517 (considering the broader language of the federal act before concluding that the 
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Like express preemption, implied preemption requires examination of 
more than the text of the statute. There are two types of implied 
preemption: field preemption and conflict preemption.38 Field 
preemption occurs when a federal regulatory scheme is “so pervasive as 
to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the 
States to supplement it.”39 Immigration, for example, is an area 
exclusively controlled by the federal government.40 Conflict preemption, 
on the other hand, occurs on a smaller scale.41 Instead of federal 
preemption over an entire area of law, as in field preemption, conflict 
preemption occurs when a particular state law conflicts with a particular 
federal law.42 A conflict may occur in two ways. First, state and federal 
law can create a situation in which it is literally impossible to comply 
with both laws.43 Impossibility preemption is not at issue here because a 
CFS would not be in direct conflict with any federal regulation. Second, 
even if it is possible to comply with both state and federal law, a state 
law may be preempted if it “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”44 
“Obstacle” preemption requires a court to make two distinct 
determinations: (1) what the original Congressional purpose was in 
enacting the federal law, and (2) whether that purpose is impeded by the 
state law.45 Making those determinations often requires a look at the text 
express preemption provision did preempt state tort claims); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 
U.S. 525 (2001) (considering the history of federal regulation in addition to the express preemption 
language in finding that the state law was preempted). 
38.  Gade, 505 U.S. at 98 (“Absent explicit pre-emptive language, we have recognized at least 
two types of implied pre-emption: field pre-emption . . . and conflict preemption. . . .”). 
39.  Id.  
40.  Karl Manheim, State Immigration Laws and Federal Supremacy, 22 HASTINGS CONSTIT. 
L.Q. 939, 958 (1995) (discussing the “dormant immigration clause” and noting that “immigration is 
unquestionably exclusively a federal power”) (internal quotations omitted) (citing De Canas v. Bica, 
424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976)). 
41.  Gregory M. Dickinson, An Empirical Study of Obstacle Preemption in the Supreme Court, 89 
NEB. L. REV. 682, 684 (2011). 
42.  Id. at 684–85. 
43.  See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963) (noting 
that “federal exclusion of state law is inescapable . . . where compliance with both federal and state 
regulations is a physical impossibility”). 
44.  Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
45.  See, e.g., Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98–104 (1992) (concluding 
that the federal worker safety regulations preempted state regulations because Congress sought to 
promote occupational safety “while at the same time avoiding duplicative, and possibly 
counterproductive, regulation”); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. 
Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 222–23 (1986) (finding that a California law regulating nuclear power 
development was not preempted because although the primary federal objective was promotion of 
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of the statute itself, the legislative history, and the legislative intent.46 
In Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.,47 the U.S. Supreme Court 
considered the preemptive authority of federal standards that required 
auto manufacturers to install passive restraints on some, but not all, 1987 
vehicles.48 The issue was whether a lawsuit based on an injury from a 
car that was not required to have such restraints was preempted by the 
federal standards.49 The Court found that the federal objective was to 
give the manufacturer a range of choices for passive restraint systems 
that would be gradually introduced.50 The Court considered the federal 
regulations in light of the agency rulemaking history and the agency’s 
explanation in the Federal Register.51 Ultimately, the Court held that the 
plaintiff’s lawsuit, which imposed a duty on the manufacturers to install 
specific passive restraint systems, such as airbags, “would stand as an 
‘obstacle’ to the accomplishment” of the federal objectives.52 
Courts are generally reluctant to find a conflict between state and 
federal law. A finding of preemption requires a “high threshold” to be 
met “if a state law is to be pre-empted for conflicting with the purposes 
of a federal Act.”53 “[H]ypothetical or potential conflict[s]” do not meet 
this threshold,54 and courts are heavily discouraged from “seeking out 
conflicts between state and federal regulation where none clearly 
exists.”55 Therefore, although it can be difficult to determine how a court 
will rule in an obstacle preemption case, there is a tendency to find 
against federal preemption.56 
nuclear power, a secondary objective was safety, which did not conflict with the state’s goal, which 
was economic in nature).  
46.  Dickinson, supra note 41, at 704. 
47.  529 U.S. 861 (2000). 
48.  Id. at 864–65. 
49.  Id. at 886. 
50.  Id. 
51.  Id. at 877–81. 
52.  Id. at 886. 
53.  Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1985 (2011) (citing 
Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 110 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
54.  Roce v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982). 
55.  English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 90 (1990) (citing Huron Portland Cement Co. v. 
Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 446 (1960)). 
56.  Dickinson, supra note 41, at 682–83. 
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B. The Clean Air Act and Its Preemption Provisions 
Congress enacted the Clean Air Act in 196357 after Congress in 1955 
declared that air pollution was an issue that should be addressed by state 
and local governments.58 The first iteration of the act charged the 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (“HEW”) with developing 
a national research and development program to reduce air pollution 
from motor vehicles.59 HEW was required to “encourage cooperative 
activities by the States and local governments for the prevention and 
control of air pollution. . . .”60 Because of this emphasis on cooperation 
between a federal agency and state government, the Clean Air Act has 
long been known as one of several comprehensive and cooperative 
federal environmental statutory schemes.61 
Subsequent amendments continued to encourage the “cooperative 
federalism” relationship between states and the federal government. The 
first amendment to the Clean Air Act occurred in 1967 and directed each 
state to adopt state-specific ambient air standards to reduce various 
federally recognized pollutants and to create a plan to achieve those 
standards.62 The standards became known as State Implementation Plans 
(“SIPs”).63 Congress again amended the Clean Air Act in 197064 to 
“provide for a more effective program to improve the quality of the 
Nation’s air.”65 To speed progress, it developed the National Ambient 
Air Quality Standards, which placed limits on the allowed levels of 
certain pollutants per cubic meter of air.66 States were required to 
57.  Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 393 (1963). 
58.  David Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rule Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air Act, 30 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 740, 744–45 (1983). 
59.  § 3, 77 Stat. at 394. 
60.  Id. In 1970, President Nixon created the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) by 
executive order and gave the new Administrator control over Clean Air Act implementation. 
Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 84 Stat. 2086, 2087 (1970). 
61.  See Christopher T. Giovinazzo, California’s Global Warming Bill: Will Fuel Economy 
Preemption Curb California’s Air Pollution Leadership? 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 893, 899–900 (2003) 
(discussing the Clean Air Act’s significant dependence on state cooperation for success). 
62.  See Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485, 485–86 (1967) (section titled 
“Cooperative Activities and Uniform Laws”); see also Schoenbrod, supra note 58, at 744–45 
(discussing Congress’ intent in amending the Clean Air Act in 1967). 
63.  See Catharine V. Greco, State Implementation Plans Under the 1990 Clean Air Act: Can 
New York Conform?, 11 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 869, 870 (1994). 
64.  Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970). 
65.  Id.; see also Greco, supra note 63, at 870. 
66.  § 107, 84 Stat. at 1678; see also Greco, supra note 63, at 873 (explaining the development of 
federal air quality standards). 
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implement plans to meet these new national air quality standards, which 
were generally stricter than the original state standards. 
Although the Clean Air Act imposes specific requirements for state 
implementation of air quality standards, states are free to adopt air 
quality standards more stringent than those provided by federal law.67 
This freedom stems from the section of the Act calling for “Retention of 
State Authority.”68 That section provides that “nothing in this chapter 
shall preclude or deny the right of any State . . . to adopt or enforce (1) 
any standard or limitation respecting emissions of air pollutants or (2) 
any applicable implementation plan [not less stringent than the federal 
standard].”69 The Clean Air Act was intended to join the “States and the 
Federal Government [as] partners against air pollution.”70 However, the 
cooperative nature of the Clean Air Act is undermined by the express 
preemption provisions on fuel regulations and motor vehicle emissions. 
Federal preemption may also be implied when a federal law conflicts 
with or stands as an obstacle to the goals of Congress in enacting such a 
law.71 The following discussion details sections of the Clean Air Act that 
may result in express or implied preemption of a CFS in Washington. 
1. Express Preemption in the Clean Air Act 
Despite the substantial history of cooperative federalism at the heart 
of the original Clean Air Act, Congress included language in the 1970 
amendments that expressly preempted states from regulating in certain 
areas. Specifically, the Clean Air Act preempts state regulation of motor 
vehicle emissions72 and state regulation of fuel73 in certain 
67.  See Connecticut v. EPA, 656 F.2d 902, 909 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that states are “free to 
adopt air quality standards more stringent than required by the [National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards],” but that a state is not required to comply with neighboring states’ more stringent 
standards); Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Ontario v. City of Detroit, 874 F.2d 
332, 345 (6th Cir. 1989) (“The federal statutory scheme clearly contemplates that Michigan can 
make its air pollution rules as stringent as it likes, and may enforce those rules”). 
68.  See, e.g., Clean Air Act of 1970 § 116, 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2012); Clean Air Act Amendments 
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1679, 1689 (1970); Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. 
No. 90-148 § 2, 81 Stat. 485, 497 (1967); see also Oxygenated Fuels Ass’n, Inc. v. Davis, 331 F.3d 
665, 670 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that the Clean Air Act “generally seeks to preserve state authority 
in the area of pollution”). 
69.  42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2012). 
70.  Gen. Motors Corp. v. United States, 496 U.S. 530, 532 (1990). 
71.  See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963) (noting 
that “federal exclusion of state law is inescapable . . . where compliance with both federal and state 
regulations is a physical impossibility”); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
72.  Clean Air Act of 1970  § 209(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2012). 
73.  Id. at § 7545(c)(4). 
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circumstances. Both preemption provisions have a special exception for 
California.74 
The preemption provision for motor vehicle emissions standards was 
born out of Congress’ desire to lighten the compliance burden on the 
automobile manufacturing industry.75 There were two major problems 
with states regulating automobile emissions independently from the 
federal government.76 First, states with automobile factories faced 
political pressure from the automobile industry to keep regulations lax.77 
These states generally enacted less burdensome standards for fear that 
industry would move to other states.78 Second, some states, such as 
California, wanted to enact more stringent automobile emissions 
standards.79 California’s desire for stricter standards came from its 
problems with smog and air pollution.80 The regulatory inconsistency 
was a problem for the automobile industry and also had the potential to 
cause enforcement problems for states and the federal government.81 
As a result of inconsistent state standards, the automobile industry 
lobbied for the creation of federal emissions standards.82 Pressure from 
the automobile industry resulted in passage of an express preemption 
provision barring state regulation of motor vehicle emissions in the 
Clean Air Act.83 The provision did, however, include a waiver 
California, which traditionally set more stringent standards than the 
federal government.84 The waiver allowed California to continue to set 
its own emissions standards as long as they were more stringent than the 
federal standards.85 Later, Congress again amended the Clean Air Act to 
allow other states to adopt standards identical to California.86 Today, 
74.  Id. at § 7543(b), 7545(c)(4)(B). 
75.  Sarah E. Leatherwood, States Take the Wheel—Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge 
Jeep v. Crombie Gives States a Chance to Choose the Direction of Their Automobile Emissions 
Regulation, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 669, 673–74 (2008). 
76.  Id. at 673. 
77.  Id. at 674. 
78.  Id. 
79.  Id. 
80.  Id. 
81.  See id. (explaining that varying state standards caused two major problems for automobile 
manufacturers: the challenge of complying with various regulatory inconsistencies along with the 
legal burden and expense). 
82.  Id.  
83.  Id.; see also Clean Air Act of 1970 § 209(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2012). 
84.  Leatherwood, supra note 75, at 675. 
85.  42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (2012). 
86.  Clean Air Act of 1970 § 177, 42 U.S.C. § 7507 (2012). 
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there are only two vehicle emissions standards that individual states can 
adopt: the federal standards or the more stringent California standards.87 
Similar to federal preemption of motor vehicle emissions regulations, 
the 1970 Clean Air Act amendments expressly preempted state 
regulation of fuel in certain circumstances.88 State regulation of fuel or 
fuel additives was preempted when the Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”) prescribed standards regarding the same fuel or fuel 
additive.89 Like the preemption provision for motor vehicle emissions, 
California was again granted a waiver to enact standards more stringent 
than those prescribed by the federal government.90 
Notably, when the Clean Air Act was amended in 1990, the new 
amendments significantly changed the fuel preemption provision. 
Instead of directly regulating a “fuel or fuel additive,” the new 
amendments preempted state law that controlled the same “characteristic 
or component of a fuel or fuel additive.”91 This new provision actually 
broadened state authority to enact regulations92 because the pre-1990 
provision prevented states from enacting any regulation “respecting use 
of a fuel or fuel additive in a motor vehicle” that was regulated by the 
EPA.93 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals repeatedly held that the 
legislative history of the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments indicated that 
Congress was attempting to give more control over fuel regulation to the 
states.94 Furthermore, the EPA regulations were amended to make it 
clear that state regulations were only preempted if there was a federal 
rule regarding that specific characteristic or component of fuel.95 The 
change provided states with more latitude to enact regulations on fuel.96 
87.  The two standard approach (federal and California) alleviated some of the problems with the 
motor vehicle industry. Instead of needing to comply with different standards for each state, there 
are just two standards requiring compliance. 
88.  Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1698 (1970). 
89.  Reitze, supra note 10, at 486. 
90.  Clean Air Act of 1970 § 211(c)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4)(B) (2012). 
91.  Id. 
92.  Id. at 487. 
93.  See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1699 (1970) 
(Section 211(c)(4)(A) of the section titled “Regulation of Fuels”). 
94.  See Oxygenated Fuels Ass’n, Inc. v. Davis, 331 F.3d 665, 670–71 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The 
Clean Air Act generally seeks to preserve state authority.”); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. United States 
Envtl. Prot. Agency, 217 F.3d 1246, 1253 (9th Cir. 2000) (“A number of Senators explained that the 
1990 amendments preserved the authority of the states to regulate air pollution.”). 
95.  See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1699 (1970) 
(Section 211(c)(4)(A)(ii) of the section titled “Regulation of Fuels”). 
96.  See, e.g., Davis, 331 F.3d at 669–70 (holding that California’s ban on methyl tertiary-butyl 
ether (“MTBE”) in gasoline was not preempted by the Clean Air Act because it was enacted for the 
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Today, Section 211 of the Clean Air Act expressly preempts states 
from enacting fuel legislation in certain circumstances.97 State 
legislation is preempted if it encompasses “any control or prohibition 
respecting any characteristic or component of a fuel or fuel additive in a 
motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine” “for purposes of motor vehicle 
emission control.”98 Controls and prohibitions are only preempted if the 
EPA Administrator has prescribed “a control or prohibition applicable to 
such characteristic or component of a fuel or fuel additive” and the state 
prohibition is not identical to the EPA regulation.99 Thus, there must be 
some federal law that conflicts with the state regulation for the fuel 
preemption provision to take effect. 
2. The Renewable Fuel Standard and Potential Implied Preemption in 
the Clean Air Act 
The renewable fuel standard, which is a separate provision of the 
Clean Air Act, may impliedly preempt a CFS in Washington. The 
Energy Policy Act of 2005 authorized the EPA to adopt regulations to 
ensure that “gasoline sold or introduced into commerce in the United 
States . . . contains that applicable volume of renewable fuel. . . .”100 
With authority from this mandate, the EPA developed the renewable fuel 
standard program, which was designed to increase the quantity of 
renewable fuel used in the United States.101 The original standard 
required an increasing percentage of renewable fuel to be blended with 
gasoline, with four million gallons of renewable fuel to be incorporated 
into the nation’s gasoline supply in 2006 and mandating an increase to 
seven and a half billion gallons by 2012.102 This led to a significant 
purpose of protecting groundwater and not for the purpose of emissions control); Exxon Mobil 
Corp., 217 F.3d at 1256 (holding that a county requirement in Nevada that gasoline sold during the 
winter contain at least 3.5 percent oxygen content by weight did not conflict with, and was not 
preempted by, any provision of the Clean Air Act, including provision restricting state power to 
regulate and prohibit fuel additives) (citing Clean Air Act of 1970 § 211(c)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7545(c)(4)(A) (2012)). 
97.  42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4) (2012). 
98.  Id. § 7545(c)(4)(A). 
99.  Id. § 7545(c)(4)(A)(ii). 
100.  Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1501(a)(2)(A)(i), 119 Stat. 594, 1068 
(2005). 
101.  RANDY SCHNEPF & BRENT D. YACOBUCCI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40155, RENEWABLE 
FUEL STANDARD (RFS): OVERVIEW AND ISSUES 2–4 (2013), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40155.pdf. 
102.  Id. at 1. 
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increase in corn ethanol production.103 
Two years later, the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 
was enacted to increase energy efficiency and availability of renewable 
energy, while requiring more renewable fuels to be mixed with 
gasoline.104 The stated purpose of the Act was to 
move the United States toward greater energy independence and 
security, to increase the production of clean renewable fuels, to 
protect consumers, to increase the efficiency of products, 
buildings, and vehicles, to promote research on and deploy 
greenhouse gas capture and storage options and to improve the 
energy performance of the Federal Government and for other 
purposes.105 
The new renewable fuel standard increased the volume of renewable 
fuel required to be blended, expanded application to other transportation 
fuels, and required EPA to develop a lifecycle greenhouse gas 
performance threshold to ensure that renewable fuels emit fewer 
greenhouse gases than the petroleum fuels they replace.106 It was 
incorporated into the Clean Air Act at Section 211(o).107 The EPA 
updated and issued its final rule to implement the new renewable fuel 
standard program on February 3, 2010.108 
The federal renewable fuel standard mandates that renewable fuels be 
derived from one of four specific sources: total renewable fuels 
(produced from “renewable biomass” including planted crops), advanced 
biofuels (biofuels other than ethanol derived from corn starch), cellulosic 
and agricultural waste-based biofuel (fuel from cellulose), and biomass-
based biodiesel (diesel from biomass feed stocks).109 Under EPA’s 
regulations, renewable fuels mixed with gasoline must meet certain 
103.  Melissa Powers, King Corn: Will the Renewable Fuel Standard Eventually End Corn 
Ethanol’s Reign?, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 667, 668 (2010). 
104.  Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110-140, tit. II § 201, 121 Stat. 
1492 (2007) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o) (2012)). 
105.  Id.  
106.  SCHNEPF & YACOBUCCI, supra note 101, at 4. 
107.  Note that the renewable fuel standard (Section 211(o)) is codified in the same section of the 
Clean Air Act as the express fuel preemption provision (codified at Section 211(c)) discussed in 
Part II.B.2. The fuel preemption provision at Section 211(c) applies only if the EPA has regulated 
the same “characteristic or component” of fuel as the state regulation. One could argue that the 
renewable fuel standard regulates the same characteristic or component of fuel as a CFS in 
Washington. Therefore, the renewable fuel standard is relevant to the express preemption analysis 
and is also relevant independently under an implied preemption analysis. 
108.  Regulations of Fuel and Fuel Additives: Changes to Renewable Fuel Standard Program, 40 
C.F.R. § 80 (2010). 
109.  SCHNEPF & YACOBUCCI, supra note 101, at 4. 
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lifecycle GHG emissions thresholds for a given category.110 A lifecycle 
analysis under the federal renewable fuel standard is a way to measure 
the environmental impact of fuel, which considers direct and significant 
indirect emissions from production and transportation.111 “Total 
renewable fuel,” for example, is generally ethanol from corn or 
sorghum.112 The statute mandates that the GHG emissions for total 
renewable fuel from new facilities (constructed after the bill was 
enacted), as calculated by a lifecycle analysis, must be twenty percent 
below that of conventional fuels to qualify.113 However, the federal 
standard exempts existing corn facilities from the GHG lifecycle 
requirements.114 “Advanced biofuels” are derived from non-corn feed 
stocks and are required to reduce lifecycle GHG emissions by fifty 
percent to qualify.115 
The EPA regulations require a specific proportion of renewable fuels 
from each of the four categories.116 For example, the EPA required 0.004 
percent of total renewable fuel volume to be cellulosic biofuel in 
2013.117 Total renewable fuel, generally from corn ethanol, was required 
to comprise 9.74 percent of renewable fuel.118 The requisite proportion 
of renewable fuel increases each year, capping at thirty-six billion 
gallons by 2022.119 Fuel refiners, importers, and blenders must meet the 
federal standards either by purchasing and blending renewable fuel into 
gasoline or by buying credits from other parties.120 
The tension between state and federal power to regulate fuel and 
automobile emissions is a constant struggle for courts attempting to 
interpret preemption under the Clean Air Act. For example, the Act itself 
requires state enforcement of federal air quality standards through State 
Implementation Plans. State autonomy is also highlighted in the section 
110.  Id.; DAVID R. WOOLEY & ELIZABETH M. MORSS, CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK § 5:60 
(2013). 
111.  42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(1)(H) (2012). 
112.  SCHNEPF & YACOBUCCI, supra note 101, at 4. 
113.  Id. at 8. 
114.  42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(A)(i) (2012). 
115.  SCHNEPF & YACOBUCCI, supra note 101, at 4. 
116.  Id. 
117.  Regulation of Fuels and Fuels Additives: 2013 Renewable Fuel Standards, 78 Fed. Reg. 
49,794, 49,798 (Aug. 15, 2013) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 80 (2014)). 
118.  Id. 
119.  U.S. EPA, REGULATORY ANNOUNCEMENT, EPA FINALIZES REGULATIONS FOR THE 
NATIONAL RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD PROGRAM FOR 2010 AND BEYOND 2 (2010), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/renewablefuels/420f10007.pdf. 
120.  Id. at 3–4. 
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titled “Retention of State Authority.”121 This section entitles states to 
adopt air quality standards more stringent than those provided by federal 
law in many circumstances.122 The seemingly strong history of state 
regulation is undermined by explicit federal preemption over regulation 
of fuel and motor vehicle emissions. These preemption provisions have 
impeded state efforts to combat climate change and air pollution on 
several occasions.123 Further, because California is often exempt from 
preemption, much of the case law allowing state regulation may not 
apply to states other than California. It is against this background of 
federalism issues that this Essay addresses whether a CFS in 
Washington will face preemption under the Clean Air Act. 
III. CHALLENGES TO CALIFORNIA’S STANDARD: ROCKY 
MOUNTAIN FARMERS UNION V. COREY 
A recent line of cases in the Eastern District of California and the 
Ninth Circuit that challenged California’s low carbon fuel standard 
provides insight into whether a CFS in Washington would be preempted 
by the Clean Air Act. The California low carbon fuel standard was 
authorized by the California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006,124 
followed by an Executive Order issued by California’s Governor in 
January 2007.125 The act charged the California Air Resources Board 
(“CARB”) with developing regulations that would achieve the goal of 
reducing GHG emissions from California to 1990 levels by the year 
2020.126 The Executive Order then directed CARB to initiate“a 
regulatory proceeding to establish and implement the [low carbon fuel 
121.  See, e.g., Clean Air Act of 1970 § 116, 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2012); Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1689 (1970); Air Quality Act of 1967, 
Pub. L. No. 90-148 § 2, 81 Stat. 485, 497 (1967). 
122.  See Connecticut v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 656 F.2d 902, 909 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that 
states are “free to adopt air quality standards more stringent than required by the [National Ambient 
Air Quality Standards],” but that a state is not required to comply with neighboring states’ more 
stringent standards); Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Ontario v. City of Detroit, 
874 F.2d 332, 345 (6th Cir. 1989) (“The federal statutory scheme clearly contemplates that 
Michigan can make its air pollution rules as stringent as it likes, and may enforce those rules.”). 
123.  See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. City of New York, 548 F.2d 1088, 1089, 1095 (2d Cir. 1977) 
(holding that a city regulation setting lead content and volatility standards for gasoline was 
preempted); Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Jorling, 710 F. Supp. 421, 429 (N.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that a 
state regulation limiting volatility of gasoline was preempted). 
124.  California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
§§ 38500–38599 (West 2006). 
125.  Cal. Exec. Order No. S-01-07 (Jan. 18, 2007), available at 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/lcfs/eos0107.pdf. 
126.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38501(h), 38550 (2006). 
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standard].”127 CARB obliged, resulting in final adoption of the low 
carbon fuel standard in April of 2010.128 The stated purpose of the new 
regulation was to “reduce [GHG] emissions by reducing the full fuel-
cycle, carbon intensity of the transportation fuel pool used in California, 
pursuant to the California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006.”129 
To fulfill this stated purpose, the California regulations require fuel 
providers to reduce the average carbon intensity of fuels by a certain 
amount each year.130 The carbon intensity of fuel is calculated using a 
lifecycle analysis, which considers the direct and indirect emissions from 
fuel production.131 Regulated parties receive credits for fuel that has a 
carbon intensity below the standard, and debits for fuel with a carbon 
intensity above the standard.132 Unlike the federal renewable fuel 
standard, which exempts existing corn facilities from the GHG lifecycle 
requirements,133 the California standard imposes the same lifecycle 
GHG requirements on all renewable fuels.134 
In Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene,135 the plaintiffs were 
Midwest-based farm associations with an interest in increased regulation 
of the corn and soybean ethanol industry. Plaintiffs challenged 
California’s low carbon fuel standard on the basis of federal 
preemption.136 Plaintiffs argued that the standard conflicted with the 
goals of Congress in enacting the renewable fuel standard, as authorized 
by the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007.137 The Court 
found that although California was exempt from the express fuel 
preemption provision under Section 211(c)(4) of the Clean Air Act, this 
did not insulate it from a possible implied preemption challenge under 
some other section of the Clean Air Act, specifically the renewable fuel 
standard at Section 211(o).138 However, the Court declined to decide 
127.  Cal. Exec. Order No. S-01-07 (Jan. 18. 2007), available at 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/lcfs/eos0107.pdf. 
128.  CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 §§ 95480–95490 (2010) (California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard). 
129.  Id. § 95480. 
130.  Id. § 95482(b). 
131.  Id. § 95481(a)(28) (defining  “lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions”). 
132.  Id. § 95485. 
133.  Clean Air Act of 1970 § 211(o)(2)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(A)(i) (2012). 
134.  CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 § 95484(b) (2012). 
135.  843 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (E.D. Cal. 2011). 
136.  See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1078, 1096 (discussing plaintiffs’ 
interest in protecting the corn ethanol industry). 
137.  Id. at 1101. 
138.  Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1048–49, 1063 (E.D. 
Cal. 2011). 
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whether California’s low carbon fuel standard was actually preempted 
by the renewable fuel standard because it found that the parties failed to 
argue the correct standard of review. Thus, the implied federal 
preemption question remains open and will likely be instrumental in any 
challenge to a CFS in Washington. 
The Court’s analysis and discussion of the federal preemption claim 
in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union provides insight into how a court 
may analyze a federal preemption challenge to a CFS in Washington. 
This section gives a brief explanation of the Court’s reasoning and 
conclusions at the District Court level and in the appeal to the Ninth 
Circuit. 
A. District Court Proceedings 
Plaintiffs at the District Court level in Rocky Mountain Farmers 
Union argued that the California low carbon fuel standard was 
preempted by the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2005 and 
the subsequent 2007 amendments, codified at Section 211(o) of the 
Clean Air Act.139 The plaintiffs argued that California’s law was invalid 
under obstacle preemption.140 The Act authorized the EPA to set a 
national renewable fuel standard, which requires renewable fuels to be 
blended with gasoline.141 The standard excludes corn ethanol made from 
plants constructed before December 19, 2007 from the carbon intensity 
requirements imposed on other types of renewable fuels.142 Plaintiffs 
argued that the California standard frustrated the purpose of the amended 
federal renewable fuel standard.143 Unlike the national standard, 
plaintiffs argued, the California standard did not provide an exception 
for “first generation” corn ethanol producers.144 Instead, the California 
standard assessed carbon intensity in the same way for all fuels. 
Plaintiffs argued that the purpose of the amended federal standard was to 
preserve the United States corn ethanol industry, and that the California 
standard “interfere[d] with the methods by which the federal statute was 
designed to reach [its] goal.”145 
Defendant CARB denied the contention that the California standard 
139.  Id. 
140.  Id. at 1052. 
141.  See supra Part II.B.2 and notes 100–20. 
142.  Clean Air Act of 1970 § 211(o)(2)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(A)(i) (2012). 
143.  Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1065–66. 
144.  Id. 
145.  Id. (citing Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 103 (1992)). 
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was preempted by the renewable fuel standard.146 CARB pointed to 
California’s preemption waiver in the Clean Air Act,147 which, CARB 
argued, insulated California from all preemption challenges under the 
Clean Air Act.148 CARB maintained that because it was exempt from the 
express fuel preemption provision under Section 211(c)(4), it was also 
exempt from implied preemption under other parts of the Clean Air Act, 
specifically the renewable fuel standard, codified at Section 211(o). The 
court addressed this argument in two parts. First, it asked whether the 
express fuel preemption provision applied to the California standard. 
Second, it asked whether California was exempt from all types of 
preemption.149 
The court first analyzed whether the Clean Air Act preemption waiver 
for California applied to California’s low carbon fuel standard.150 The 
court split this analysis into three parts based on the text of the fuel 
preemption provision: (1) whether the California standard was a control 
or regulation “for the purpose of motor vehicle emissions”151; (2) 
whether the standard was a control or prohibition respecting any 
“characteristic or component of a fuel or fuel additive”152; and (3) 
whether the standard was a “control respecting any fuel or fuel 
additive.”153 The court answered “yes” to all three questions and found 
that the preemption exemption authorized the California standard with 
respect to the federal fuels regulations set forth in Section 211(c) of the 
Clean Air Act.154 Concluding that California’s standard fit within the 
express fuel preemption waiver under Section 211(c)(4), the court 
considered whether California’s standard was exempt from preemption 
by other portions of the Clean Air Act, namely the renewable fuel 
standard, codified at Section 211(o), where there was no express 
preemption provision.155 
146.  Id. at 1054. 
147.  42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4)(A) (“[N]o State . . . may prescribe or attempt to enforce, for 
purposes of motor vehicle emission control, any control or prohibition respecting any characteristic 
or component of a fuel or fuel additive in a motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine . . . (ii) if the 
Administrator has prescribed . . . a control or prohibition applicable to such characteristic or 
component of a fuel or fuel additive.”). 
148.  Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1054. 
149.  Id. 
150.  Id. at 1055. 
151.  Id.  
152.  Id. at 1057. 
153.  Id. at 1061. 
154.  Id. at 1061–62. 
155.  Id. at 1062. 
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The court did not, however, find that California’s preemption waiver 
exempted the California standard from preemption analysis under other 
federal laws, including other provisions of the Clean Air Act.156 Instead, 
it found that “[f]ederal preemption, and California’s preemption 
exceptions, differ under each Section 211 subsection.”157 The court cited 
to Davis v. Environmental Protection Agency,158 which found that 
California’s preemption waiver did not exempt California from 
preemption analysis under a different subsection of the Clean Air Act, 
namely Section 211(k).159 Therefore, the court found, California’s 
exemption from the fuel preemption provision did “not grant California 
the authority to enact a regulation that conflicts with the [renewable fuel 
standard], as set forth in section 211(o).”160 
Although the court found that California’s exemption from the 
express fuel preemption provision under Section 211(c)(4) did not 
preclude preemption by the renewable fuel standard in Section 211(o), 
the court declined consideration of the implied preemption claim on the 
merits because neither party addressed the appropriate standard of 
review.161 Because the court did not decide whether the federal 
renewable fuel standard preempted the California low carbon fuel 
standard, the parties did not appeal the decision to the Ninth Circuit. 
This obstacle preemption issue remains open. 
B. The Ninth Circuit Briefly Addressed Preemption 
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union was appealed to the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.162 However, because the District Court 
did not address whether the renewable fuel standard163 preempted 
California’s low carbon fuel standard,164 the issue was not brought 
156.  Id. at 1062 (“Section 211(c)(4)(B) does not authorize California to enact and enforce fuel 
standards that conflict with federal laws, including other provisions of the Clean Air Act such as 
[the Energy Independence and Security Act], Section 211(o).”). 
157.  Id.  
158.  348 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 2003). 
159.  Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1057 (citing Davis, 348 F.3d at 786). 
160.  Id. at 1063. 
161.  Id. at 1071.  
162.  Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013). 
163.  Clean Air Act of 1970 § 211(o), 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o) (2012). 
164.  Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1071 (refusing to address whether 
California’s low carbon fuel standard was preempted by the Energy Independence and Security Act 
because neither party argued the correct standard of review). 
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before the Ninth Circuit.165 The court did note California’s fuel 
preemption waiver in the Clean Air Act briefly in its opinion.166 CARB 
argued that Section 211(c)(4)(B)—California’s exemption from the 
Clean Air Act preemption provision—authorized the low carbon fuel 
standard under the Commerce Clause.167 In rejecting this argument, the 
court noted that the California standard fell within the fuel preemption 
exemption because it was “a control respecting a fuel or fuel additive 
and was enacted for the purpose of emissions control.”168 The Court did 
not address whether there was any federal regulation that would actually 
preempt the California standard. 
IV. THE CLEAN AIR ACT IS UNLIKELY TO PREEMPT A CLEAN 
FUEL STANDARD IN WASHINGTON  
The Clean Air Act’s express declaration of federal preemption for 
state regulation of fuel additives,169 combined with the Clean Air Act’s 
renewable fuel standard170 may be used to challenge a CFS in 
Washington.171 State regulation of fuel additives is only preempted if it 
conflicts with a federal regulation.172 The federal renewable fuel 
standard has the potential to preempt a CFS in Washington.173 First, this 
section will analyze whether a CFS in Washington would be preempted 
by the Clean Air Act express fuel preemption provision, 
Section 211(c)(4). Second, this section analyzes whether the national 
renewable fuel standard—codified at Section 211(o) in the Clean Air 
Act—would preempt a CFS in Washington. It concludes that federal 
preemption of a CFS in Washington—under both express and implied 
preemption—is unlikely. 
165.  Corey, 730 F.3d at 1107 (“We express no opinion on Plaintiffs’ claim that the Fuel Standard 
is preempted by the [renewable fuel standard].”). 
166.  Id. at 1106. 
167.  Id. 
168.  Id. (citing Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1061). 
169.  Clean Air Act of 1970 § 211(c)(4)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4)(C) (2012). 
170.  Clean Air Act of 1970 § 211(o), 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o) (2012). 
171.  See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1065–68. Plaintiffs challenged 
California’s low carbon fuel standard based on implied preemption under the federal renewable fuel 
standard. Id. The issue was not decided and remains open. Id. Therefore, opponents to a CFS in 
Washington will likely attempt preemption based on the renewable fuel standard. 
172.  42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4)(A)(ii). 
173.  See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1065 (plaintiffs argued that the 
California low carbon fuel standard stood as an obstacle to Congress’ intent when it enacted section 
211(o) of the Clean Air Act—the renewable fuel standard). 
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A. Clean Air Act Express Preemption: Section 211(c)(4) 
The Clean Air Act would not expressly preempt a CFS in Washington 
because the EPA has not regulated the carbon intensity of fuel. Section 
211(c)(4) is the express fuel preemption provision in the Clean Air Act, 
but it is merely procedural and not substantive.174 Under 
Section 211(c)(4), the EPA must have regulated the same “characteristic 
or component” of fuel as the state regulation for express preemption to 
apply.175 Therefore, the test for express preemption under the statute is 
twofold. First, the state law must regulate a “characteristic or 
component” of fuel. Here, a court would likely determine that a 
Washington CFS would regulate a “characteristic or component” of 
fuel.176 Second, the state law must regulate the same “characteristic or 
component” of fuel as federal law. This analysis requires consideration 
of a separate, substantive federal regulation to arrive at express 
preemption.177 Opponents of a CFS in Washington will likely point to 
the federal renewable fuel standard, codified at Section 211(o). The 
pertinent question for this analysis is whether the federal renewable fuel 
standard regulates the same “characteristic or component” of fuel as 
would be regulated by a CFS in Washington. 
Express preemption analysis under Section 211(c)(4) requires more 
than a simple look at the plain language of the statute. Courts often 
consider the legislative history, purpose, and the broader context of the 
statute when interpreting the scope of express preemption language.178 
Here, the analysis requires comparison between the scope of the federal 
renewable fuel standard and a CFS in Washington. This section will 
compare the two standards by considering the content, along with the 
congressional purpose in enacting the two standards. It finds that the 
federal standard regulates the source of fuel, focusing on renewables, 
and a Washington CFS would regulate the carbon intensity of fuel. It 
174.  42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4). 
175.  Id. at § 7545(c)(4)(A)(ii). 
176.  See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1057 (finding that California’s low 
carbon fuel standard regulated a “characteristic or component” of fuel for purposes of the Clean Air 
Act.) Because a CFS in Washington would likely mimic California’s standard, a court would also 
likely find that a CFS regulates a “characteristic or component” of fuel. 
177.  Id. 
178.  See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 548 (2001) (considering the history of 
federal regulation in addition to the express preemption language in finding that the state law was 
preempted); Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 522 (1992) (considering the broader 
language of the federal act before concluding that the express preemption provision did preempt 
state tort claims). 
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concludes that the state standard does not regulate the same 
“characteristic or component” of fuel as the federal standard and should 
not be preempted. 
As discussed above, the Ninth Circuit noted that the California low 
carbon fuel standard fell within the Clean Air Act fuel preemption 
provision. It explained that the California standard was “a control 
respecting a fuel or fuel additive and was enacted for the purpose of 
emissions control.”179 However, California’s preemption waiver 
exempted the California standard from analysis under the Clean Air 
Act’s express fuel preemption provision.180 The Court simply decided 
that California would be exempt from express preemption and therefore 
avoided engaging in a full analysis under the preemption provision. 
Specifically, the Court did not consider whether the EPA had prescribed 
a “control or prohibition respecting any characteristic or component of a 
fuel or fuel additive,” as required by the preemption provision.181 Unlike 
California, however, Washington is not exempt from the fuel preemption 
provision expressly written in the Clean Air Act.182 Therefore, an 
attempt to enact a CFS in Washington will likely result in a challenge 
based on express preemption. 
As explained in Part II.B.1,183 express federal preemption of state 
regulation of fuel only occurs when the EPA has “prescribed . . . a 
control or prohibition applicable to such characteristic or component of a 
fuel or fuel additive.”184 Such a federal regulation is required for the fuel 
preemption provision to come into play.185 If there is no federal 
regulation on point, there is no preemption.186 Therefore, states may 
enact regulations that would fall under the express preemption provision 
as long as there is no federal regulation that concerns the same 
179.  Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1077, 1106 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal 
quotation omitted) (citing Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1061). 
180.  Corey, 730 F.3d at 1106 (citing Davis v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 348 F.3d 772, 
786 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
181.  Id. 
182.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7543(b); 7545(c)(4)(B) (California is the only state exempt from 
preemption). 
183.  See supra notes 72–99. 
184.  42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4)(A)(ii). 
185.  Id.; see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 217 F.3d 1246, 1256 (9th Cir. 
2000) (holding that a county requirement in Nevada that gasoline sold during the winter contain at 
least 3.5 percent oxygen content by weight did not conflict with, and was not preempted by, any 
provision of the Clean Air Act, including provision restricting state power to regulate and prohibit 
fuel additives) (citing Clean Air Act § 211(c)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4)(A) (2012)). 
186.  Id. at 1253–56. 
 
                                                     
Nelsen-Federal Preemption and a Clean Fuel Standard-PostDTP.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/20/2015  1:19 PM 
2015] FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND A CLEAN FUEL STANDARD 79 
“characteristic or component” of that particular fuel or fuel additive.187 
This is particularly important to the present analysis. Application of the 
express preemption provision to a CFS in Washington requires 
consideration of other federal laws regulating carbon intensity of fuel. 
The most obvious federal law that may result in express preemption is 
the renewable fuel standard.188 As explained in Part II.B.2,189 the 
renewable fuel standard requires that a certain amount of renewable fuel 
be blended into transportation fuels each year.190 The renewable fuel 
standard focuses on the source of renewables, requiring fuel vendors to 
blend certain volumes of each of the four recognized categories of 
renewable fuel into gasoline.191 The EPA sets volumes for each category 
of renewable based on percentage of total renewable fuels.192 
By setting volume requirements for each category of renewable fuel, 
the renewable fuel standard targets the source of fuel. In large part, the 
renewable fuel standard focuses on whether the sources of transportation 
fuels are adequately diversified. Congress’ purpose in passing the 
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 was to “move the United 
States toward greater energy independence and security.”193 When 
considered in light of the purpose of the Act, source diversification is a 
logical approach to achieve the stated goals. It requires a specific 
percentage of fuel from planted crops, a certain percentage from biofuels 
derived from cornstarch, a percentage from cellulose, and a percentage 
of diesel from biomass feed stocks.194 Thus, the EPA is meeting the 
stated purpose of the act by requiring specified volumes of diverse 
renewable fuels.195 
In contrast, emphasis on the specific source of renewable fuels is 
completely absent from proposals for a Washington CFS.196 Unlike the 
federal standard, Washington would not require certain percentages of 
187.  Clean Air Act of 1970 § 211(c)(4)(A)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4)(A)(ii) (2012).  
188.  Id. § 7545(o). 
189.  See supra notes 100–20.  
190.  42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2) (2012). 
191.  See supra Part II.B.2. 
192.  See id. 
193.  Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, tit. II § 201, 121 Stat. 
1492, 1519 (2007) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o) (2012)).  
194.  SCHNEPF & YACOBUCCI, supra note 101, at 4. 
195.  See Powers, supra note 103, at 668–69 (explaining that EISA has been “wildly successful” 
at reducing United States dependence on foreign oil, but not successful at reducing carbon 
emissions). 
196.  See supra Part I. 
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fuel from cellulosic biofuels or planted crops.197 Instead, a Washington 
CFS would focus entirely on the carbon intensity of fuel. As explained 
in Part I, the “carbon intensity” of a transportation fuel is the amount of 
lifecycle GHG emissions per unit of energy of fuel.198 Regulated fuel 
providers will receive credits for fuel with a carbon intensity value 
below the standard, and debits if the carbon intensity value is above the 
standard. 199 In other words, the source of renewables is irrelevant to a 
CFS. The crux of the policy is its focus on the carbon intensity of fuel. 
Thus, the “characteristic or component” that would be regulated by 
Washington’s CFS is not the same “characteristic or component” as 
regulated by the renewable fuel standard. 
The focus on regulating carbon intensity under a CFS is a logical 
means to fulfill Washington’s legislatively mandated reductions in state 
GHG emissions.200 Governor Inslee highlighted a CFS as a method to 
achieve these reductions.201 Requiring a reduction in the carbon intensity 
of fuel would likely result in statewide GHG emissions reductions. 
Therefore, the policy would be designed to achieve statewide goals. 
On the other hand, Congress’ stated goal in enacting the renewable 
fuel standard was to “move the United States toward greater energy 
independence and security.”202 One major critique of the federal 
standard is that it has not effectively reduced GHG emissions from 
transportation fuels.203 For example, the federal standard requires high 
volumes of traditional renewable fuels, mainly corn ethanol, to be 
blended into fuel. However, corn ethanol may actually emit more GHG 
emissions than traditional petroleum-based fuels.204 
Like a CFS, the federal renewable fuel standard does require some 
renewable fuels to meet specific GHG emissions thresholds, which are 
197.  PONT & UNNASCH, supra note 6, at 9. 
198.  See supra Part I. 
199.  PONT & UNNASCH, supra note 6, at 39 (analysis commissioned by the Washington State 
Department of Ecology to determine impacts associated with a CFS in Washington draws on 
California’s low carbon fuel standard for several assumptions). 
200.  H. B. 2815 60th Legis., Reg. Sess (Wash. 2008) (regarding Greenhouse Gas Emissions) 
(codified at WASH. REV. CODE. § 70.235.020(1)(a)(i) (2014)). 
201.  JAY INSLEE, POLICY BRIEF: WASHINGTON CARBON POLLUTION REDUCTION AND CLEAN 
ENERGY LEADERSHIP 1–2 (Dec. 17, 2014), available at 
http://www.governor.wa.gov/sites/default/files/policy_briefs/pb_Carbon_pollution_reduction_2014.
pdf.  
202.  See Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, tit. II § 201, 121 
Stat. 1492, 1519 (2007) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o) (2012)). 
203.  Powers, supra note 103, at 668–69. 
204.  Id. 
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calculated using a lifecycle analysis.205 However, certain fuels—many 
corn-based ethanols, for example—are exempt from the emissions 
thresholds.206 The exemption for corn-based ethanol from the GHG 
emission requirements further demonstrates that Congress’ goal was to 
reduce dependency on foreign oil by strengthening domestic renewable 
fuel sources, rather than to limit GHG emissions. Furthermore, the GHG 
emissions threshold is a preliminary step in the regulation. Renewable 
fuels in each category are first assessed according to the GHG emissions 
threshold. Fuels that meet the required thresholds are then blended with 
gasoline based on required volumes of each renewable fuel. Therefore, 
the focus of the federal standard is centered on increasing the use of fuel 
from non-petroleum-based sources and not on GHG emissions 
thresholds.207 
The fuel preemption provision in the Clean Air Act only applies if the 
EPA has regulated the same “characteristic or component of a fuel or 
fuel additive” as is targeted by the state regulation.208 The federal 
renewable fuel standard does not regulate the same characteristic of fuel 
as would be regulated by a Washington CFS. The federal standard 
regulates the source of renewable fuels, requiring certain volumes to be 
derived from each of four different categories. In contrast, a Washington 
CFS would regulate the carbon intensity of renewable fuels. It would not 
require percentages from specific sources. This conclusion is further 
validated by a look at legislative purpose: Washington’s purpose was to 
reduce GHG emissions, while the federal purpose was to move the 
United States toward greater energy independence. Therefore, a CFS in 
Washington would not be preempted by the federal renewable fuel 
standard because they do not regulate the same “characteristic or 
component” of fuel, as required by the Clean Air Act. 
B. Clean Air Act Implied Preemption 
A CFS in Washington does not “stand as an obstacle to Congress’ 
objectives” under the federal renewable fuel standard, authorized by the 
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, and should not be 
preempted. Whether a CFS in Washington would be preempted by the 
federal renewable fuel standard is an open question following the Ninth 
205.  42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(1)(B)(i) (2012). 
206.  Id. 
207.  Powers, supra note 103, at 668. 
208.  Clean Air Act of 1970 § 211(o), 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4)(A)(ii) (2012). 
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Circuit’s decision in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union.209 Opponents to a 
CFS in Washington will likely use the renewable fuel standard, 
Section 211(o) of the Clean Air Act, to argue implied obstacle 
preemption. This section analyzes the merits of such an argument and 
concludes that the CFS would not be preempted. 
Plaintiffs in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union argued that California’s 
low carbon fuel standard interfered with “the methods by which the 
federal statute was designed to reach [its] goal.”210 This argument is one 
of implied preemption under the federal renewable fuel standard211 and 
is an argument that is likely to be included in a challenge to a CFS in 
Washington. Specifically, the question is whether the state law “stands 
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes 
or objectives of Congress.”212 Obstacle preemption was never analyzed 
in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union because the court found that neither 
party addressed the appropriate standard of review.213 
A challenge to a CFS in Washington will likely hinge on obstacle 
preemption by the federal renewable fuel standard, authorized by the 
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007.214 In analyzing whether 
a Washington CFS would be preempted by the federal renewable fuel 
standard, the question is whether it would “stand[] as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes or objectives of 
Congress.”215 As noted earlier, Congress’ stated objective in enacting the 
renewable fuel standard was to “move the United States toward greater 
energy independence and security.”216 The question in an obstacle 
preemption analysis is whether a CFS in Washington conflicts with 
Congress’ purpose in enacting the federal law.217 
A significant difference between California’s standard and the federal 
renewable fuel standard in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union was in the 
treatment of corn ethanol. This would likely be the most controversial 
209.  730 F.3d 1070, 1107 (9th Cir. 2013). 
210.  Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1066 (E.D. Cal. 2011) 
(citing Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 103 (1992)). 
211.  Id. 
212.  See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (setting the standard for obstacle 
preemption). 
213.  Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1071. 
214.  See supra Part II.B.2. 
215.  Hines, 312 U.S. at 67. 
216.  Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, tit. II § 201, 121 Stat. 
1492, 1519 (2007) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o) (2012)). 
217.  Hines, 312 U.S. at 67. 
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part of the Washington CFS, as well. While the federal standard favors 
all renewable fuels, the Washington CFS would only favor renewables 
with a low carbon impact. The production of corn ethanol, although 
renewable, can actually produce more carbon dioxide than it absorbs in 
the atmosphere.218 Although this may theoretically work to fulfill the 
federal purpose by decreasing the United States’ dependence on foreign 
oil, it hardly advances Washington’s goal to reduce carbon emissions 
from transportation fuel.219 
The issue is one of Congressional purpose. In Pacific Gas & Electric 
Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development 
Commission,220 for example, the Court found that a California law that 
put a moratorium on nuclear power development was not preempted by 
a federal law. Although it found that the primary purpose of the federal 
law was promotion of nuclear power, it found that a secondary objective 
was safety. The Court found that the California objective was economic 
in nature. It therefore concluded that the state law’s purpose did not 
obstruct the federal purpose to enhance safety.221 
Here, the analysis seems even clearer. The purpose of the Energy 
Independence and Security Act of 2007, which authorized the renewable 
fuel standard, was plainly stated as moving the United States toward 
greater energy independence.222 As explained in Part IV.A,223 EPA 
requires that fuel providers blend escalating volumes of certain 
categories of renewable fuels to achieve this goal. A CFS in Washington 
would require an increase in the amount of renewable transportation 
fuels used in Washington. A CFS would not require that renewables be 
derived from a specific source; it would instead preference renewables 
218.  See Leah Stiegler, Comment, Avoiding the Catch-22: Reforming the Renewable Fuel 
Standard to Protect Freshwater Resources and Promote Energy Independence, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 
1063, 1091 (2014) (arguing that the federal renewable fuel standard favors corn ethanol and that this 
has significant environmental impacts); Morgan Brubaker, Comment, Dream of Californication: 
Constitutional Questions Put the Brakes on the Nation’s First Low Carbon Fuel Standard, 22 VILL. 
ENVTL. L.J. 57, 65 (2011) (discussing the impact of land conversion from forest or grassland to corn 
fields, which generally increases the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere). 
219.  See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD PROGRAM (RFS2) 
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 483 (Feb. 2010), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/oms/renewablefuels/420r10006.pdf (analyzing corn ethanol production and 
noting that “unless we analyze the lifecycle GHG emissions of corn ethanol over more than 14 
years, corn ethanol from this pathway will not achieve a reduction compared to gasoline.”). 
220.  461 U.S. 190 (1983). 
221.  Id. at 220–23. 
222.  See Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, tit. II § 201, 121 
Stat. 1492, 1519 (2007) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o) (2012)). 
223.  See supra notes 174–208. 
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with a lower carbon intensity. Rather than stand as an obstacle to the 
purpose of the federal standard, a CFS in Washington would serve as a 
complement. Increased renewable fuels would likely result in greater 
energy independence nationwide. At the very least, it does nothing to 
impede the federal objectives. 
Plaintiffs in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union argued that Congress 
intended to ensure a continued nationwide market for corn ethanol by 
exempting existing corn ethanol producers from the GHG emissions 
threshold requirement.224 However, this alleged intent appears nowhere 
in the legislation, and plaintiffs did not cite to anywhere that it appeared 
in the legislative history. For a court to speculate that Congress intended 
to bolster nationwide sales of corn ethanol by enacting the renewable 
fuel standard is likely a stretch. It also requires that a court ignore the 
stated purpose of the Act: to move the United States toward energy 
independence. 
Far from conflicting with the stated objectives of the federal 
renewable fuel standard, a CFS would likely further federal goals. Based 
on Supreme Court precedent and consideration of the doctrine’s 
reluctance to find preemption of state law,225 it is unlikely that a court 
would find a CFS in Washington preempted. 
CONCLUSION 
A CFS enacted in Washington State will likely meet resistance from 
parties with a financial stake in the current fuel economy. Based on 
challenges to the California standard, federal preemption under the 
Clean Air Act is likely to be raised to challenge a Washington CFS. 
Although the federal renewable fuel standard may appear similar to a 
CFS on its face, a court is unlikely to find a Washington CFS preempted. 
Under the express preemption standard, a court is unlikely to find that a 
Washington CFS would regulate the same characteristic of fuel as the 
federal renewable fuel standard, as required by the Clean Air Act fuel 
preemption provision, Section 211(c). Unlike the federal standard’s 
focus on the source of renewables, a CFS in Washington would regulate 
the carbon intensity of fuel. A CFS in Washington would likely also 
survive an obstacle preemption analysis under the renewable fuel 
224.  Compl. for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief & Jury Demand, Rocky Mountain Farmers 
Union v. Goldstene, No. 1:10-cv-00163-LJO-DLB, 2010 WL 412389, at *13 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 
2010). 
225.  Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1985 (2011) (citing 
Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 110 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
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standard, Section 211(o) because it does not obstruct Congress’ purpose. 
The stated purpose of the federal standard is to move the United States 
toward greater energy independence; the stated purpose of the 
Washington CFS would be to reduce GHG emissions from 
transportation fuels. Far from inhibiting the federal standard, the 
Washington CFS actually serves as a complement. Therefore, it is 
unlikely that a CFS in Washington would be preempted by the Clean Air 
Act. 
 
 
